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II.-165 
TO BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT OR NOT TO 
BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT: THE USE  
OF VIDEOCONFERENCES DURING  
FELONY PROCEEDINGS 
Abstract: In April 26, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit held, in United States v. Bethea, that a felony defendant could not af-
firmatively waive his right to be physically present in the courtroom, despite re-
questing to appear via videoconference during his combined plea and sentenc-
ing hearing. Bethea represented a matter of first impression among the federal 
circuit courts. This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit’s decision is in line 
with the decisions its sister circuits regarding similar questions that strictly in-
terpreted the plain text of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
This Comment further argues that courts should consider, when analyzing Rule 
43, their power to advocate to Congress for more discretion in allowing vide-
oconferences for defendants with severe health and mobility problems. The 
Seventh Circuit missed a clear opportunity to do so in Bethea. 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary goal of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is to pro-
tect defendants’ constitutional rights during criminal proceedings.1 Federal 
case law has established that when a defendant enters a plea, it must be made 
“voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.”2 With limited exceptions, Rule 43 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure further requires a defendant be 
“present” during a plea or sentencing hearing.3 Those exceptions are specifi-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See MARK S. RHODES, ORFIELD’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES 
§ 43:3 (2d ed. 1987) (noting that Rule 43 “incorporates a defendant’s constitutional due process 
right to be present at trial”). The presence requirement stems from the need to protect a defend-
ant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses who testify against them. U.S. CONST. amend. VI 
(“in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him”); Wade v. United States, 441 F.2d 1046, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (describing the 
constitutional history of Rule 43). 
 2 See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 239 (2018) (citing United States 
v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)) (noting that a guilty plea is valid only if made voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently). For a plea to be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, 
the accused must affirmatively consent to waiving the accused’s constitutional right to a trial and 
further the accused must have a general understanding of the facts and law of the proceeding. See 
id. (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)) (detailing that a defendant must 
“understand[] the law in relation to the facts”). A plea is not made voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently when, for example, the accused is threatened or coerced to enter a guilty plea. See id. 
(citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970)) (“a plea must not be induced by improp-
er promises, threats, or coercion”). 
 3 FED. R. CRIM. P. 43. 
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cally enumerated in Rule 43(b) and (c) and include allowing a defendant to 
waive physical presence and appear via videoconference for misdemeanor 
pleas and sentencing hearings.4 Those exceptions align with the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure’s long-standing policy of protecting the rights of de-
fendants by preventing a trial from proceeding in a defendant’s absence.5 
In 2018, in United States v. Bethea, the Seventh Circuit decided, as a 
matter of first impression, that it is per se prejudicial error for a felony plea 
hearing to occur without the defendant being physically in the courtroom, 
despite the defendant’s attempted affirmative waiver of Rule 43’s physical 
presence requirement.6 The Seventh Circuit held that it is beyond a court’s 
discretion to permit videoconferences for felony plea and sentencing hearings 
because Rule 43 is narrowly tailored and requires a defendant’s physical 
presence during such proceedings.7 That decision emphasized the judiciary’s 
strict interpretation of the physical presence requirement in felony proceed-
ings.8 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. In the 2011 amendments, the drafters specifically allowed videoconference for misde-
meanor offenses. Id. There was no explicit discussion in the amendments regarding the choice to 
limit videoconferences to misdemeanor offenses. Id. 
 5 See Wade, 441 F.2d at 1050–51 (holding that the defendant’s absence during open court 
proceedings between judge and jury constituted reversible error because of the reasonable possi-
bility of prejudice and adverse inferences regarding the defendant’s absence by the initially dead-
locked jury); United States v. Lockwood, 382 F. Supp. 1111, 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that 
the defendant’s presence in the courtroom during proceedings is explicit in Rule 43 where there is 
a sentencing hearing, but that the requirement does not extend to pretrial motions where the de-
fendant’s absence would not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses). 
 6 United States v. Bethea, 888 F.3d 864, 867 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Torres-
Palma, 290 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir. 2002)) (stating that Rule 43 explicitly requires physical 
presence during sentencing to uphold a defendant’s constitutional rights and that it is a per se 
prejudicial error for a defendant to waive his physical presence requirement). When the court finds 
a per se prejudicial error, the mere fact of the violation of the rule requires reversal and a harmless 
error analysis is insufficient to remedy the violation. Id. In contrast to per se prejudicial error inter-
pretations, harmless error analysis requires the court to determine if there was the reasonable pos-
sibility of prejudice or if the change would have altered the court’s decision. Torres-Palma, 290 
F.3d at 1248. 
 7 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 867. The Seventh Circuit followed its sister circuits’ standard of review 
for interpreting unambiguous rules of criminal procedure, finding no leeway for the court to alter 
the clear meaning of the rule. Id. (stating that the court’s decision is based on the plain language of 
the text of Rule 43); see United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 764 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that 
“[t]he text of Rule 43 does not allow video conferencing” and the “structure of the Rule does not 
support it”); United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 235–37 (5th Cir. 1999) (relying on the plain 
language of the text of Rule 43 to determine that a defendant cannot waive the physical presence 
requirement).  
 8 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 867; see Williams, 641 F.3d at 764–65 (declining to adopt the govern-
ment’s proposed harmless error analysis for felony defendant’s sentencing via videoconference 
where the videoconference feed was uninterrupted and all parties could adequately hear each other 
during the proceedings because Rule 43 lays out narrow exceptions where videoconferencing may 
be permitted and felony sentencings are excluded from those exceptions); United States v. Law-
rence, 248 F.3d 300, 305 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the government’s argument that financial and 
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Part I of this Comment discusses the facts at issue in Bethea that initiat-
ed the use of videoconferencing in the combined plea and sentencing hearing, 
the fundamentals of Rule 43, and the Seventh Circuit’s ruling.9 Part II ex-
plains the different positions argued before the Seventh Circuit on the extent 
to which the physical presence requirement in Rule 43 may be waived.10 Part 
III analyzes the legal significance of the word “videoconferencing” and ar-
gues that the Seventh Circuit’s application of Rule 43 was consistent with its 
sister circuits’ view of a strict physical presence requirement in felony pro-
ceedings because of the intangible benefits of physical presence.11 Part III 
further argues that, despite the court’s correct ruling, the Seventh Circuit 
should have taken the opportunity to address the need for Congress to provide 
for accommodations to the physical presence requirement.12 
I. RULE 43’S PRESENCE REQUIREMENT AND THE TRIAL JUDGE’S 
ACCEPTANCE OF A GUILTY PLEA VIA VIDEOCONFERENCE IN BETHEA 
As a matter of first impression, the Seventh Circuit held in Bethea that a 
violation of Rule 43’s physical presence requirement in a felony plea or sen-
tencing hearing is per se prejudicial error, even when the defendant requests 
to appear via videoconference for such a hearing.13 Section A of this Part pro-
vides an overview of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.14 
Section B details the facts of Bethea and the procedural history of the case 
from its initiation in district court to its appeal to the Seventh Circuit.15 
                                                                                                                           
time considerations must be considered in interpreting Rule 43’s presence requirement and hold-
ing instead that the clear meaning of Rule 43 requires a defendant’s physical presence at sentenc-
ing where there were no exceptions permitting a videoconference in such instances); Navarro, 169 
F.3d at 235–37 (reversing the district court’s order requiring the defendant to appear via videocon-
ference for sentencing and noting that, although videoconferencing is beneficial for reducing 
costs, the plain language of Rule 43 does not permit the court to consider such factors regarding 
waiver of the explicit physical presence requirement). 
 9 See infra notes 13–31 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 32–52 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 53–64 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 65–76 and accompanying text. 
 13 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 867 (citing Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1248) (emphasizing the princi-
ple that it is both counsel and the judge’s duty to inform and protect a defendant from waiving his 
right to be present in the courtroom during proceedings in order to protect the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses). 
 14 See infra notes 16–22 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 23–31 and accompanying text. 
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A. Rule 43’s Requirement that the Defendant be Present  
During Courtroom Proceedings 
Rule 43(a) specifically requires the defendant to be physically present at 
plea and sentencing hearings.16 The primary goal of the physical presence 
requirement in courtroom proceedings is to provide the defendant and judge 
with unique benefits that are unavailable in a video teleconference.17 Those 
benefits include the ability to prevent an adverse inference from the lack of an 
appearance, the attention to non-verbal cues, and the ability for the defendant 
to personally interact with defense counsel.18 
The rule requiring a defendant’s presence for her initial appearance, ini-
tial arraignment, and plea is not absolute, but its few exceptions are specifi-
cally enumerated in Rule 43(a).19 Notably, in 2011, Rule 43 was amended to 
allow videoconference pleas for misdemeanor offenses.20 Despite that 
amendment regarding misdemeanor offenses, there is no provision in Rule 43 
explicitly permitting a defendant to waive the presence requirement and af-
firmatively consent to a felony plea by videoconferencing.21 While the 
amendment notes to the rule are silent regarding videoconferences for felony 
                                                                                                                           
 16 FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a); Bethea, 888 F.3d at 866. Jurisdictions outside the Seventh Circuit 
interpret the language of Rule 43(a) stating that “the defendant must be present” as a mandatory 
requirement, which the defendant cannot waive. See, e.g., In re United States, 784 F.2d 1062, 
1062–63 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the trial court erred in entering a guilty plea in the defend-
ant’s absence). Rule 43(a) requires, except as otherwise provided in Rules 5 or 10, the defendant’s 
presence “at: (1) the initial appearance, the initial arraignment, and the plea; (2) every trial stage, 
including jury empanelment and the return of the verdict; and (3) sentencing.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 
43(a). Rule 5 and 10 provide exceptions to the presence requirement for a defendant’s initial ap-
pearance and for a defendant’s arraignment, respectively. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5, 10. 
 17 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 867. 
 18 Id.; see Williams, 641 F.3d at 764 (explaining the “intangible and difficult to articulate 
effects” of physical presence in a courtroom that are absent when videoconferencing is used); 
United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595, 599–601 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that face-to-face meet-
ings allow judges to glean impressions and credibility that would not otherwise be noticed in a 
videoconference); Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 303–05 (holding that videoconferencing is not equiva-
lent to physically being present in the courtroom). 
 19 FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b), (c). Exceptions to the physical presence requirement include pro-
ceeding involving a sentence correction and instances when an initially present defendant pleads 
guilty and waives continued presence. Id. 
 20 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 866. The amendment to Rule 43 added, in relevant part, Rule 43(b)(2) 
which provides an exception to the physical presence requirement where “[t]he offense is punish-
able by fine or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, and with the defendant’s 
written consent, the court permits arraignment, plea, trial, and sentencing to occur by video tele-
conferencing or in the defendant’s absence.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b). In Bethea, the court found 
that the drafters’ lack of an affirmative approval was an intentional rejection of the use of video 
conferencing for felony pleas and sentencings. Bethea, 888 F.3d at 866. 
 21 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 866. Further, a court may only accept a guilty plea when it is made 
completely voluntarily. See 22 C.J.S., supra note 2, § 239 (citing Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629) (noting 
that a guilty plea is valid only if made voluntarily). Otherwise, the plea may be vacated on appeal. 
Id. 
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proceedings, courts interpreting related questions have read the absence of 
such a provision as an intentional rejection of alternative exceptions to the 
physical presence requirement. 22 
B. Bethea’s Request to Plead Guilty via Videoconference and Subsequent 
Argument on Appeal to Vacate his Conviction 
Between April and October 2014, Gregory Bethea used eight fraudulent-
ly obtained credit card numbers to purchase merchandise from retailers in Ja-
nesville and Madison, Wisconsin totaling $62,888.48.23 On February 15, 2017, 
a grand jury in the Western District of Wisconsin indicted Bethea for posses-
sion of counterfeit access devices in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(1).24 In 
May 2017, Bethea agreed to plead guilty to the one-count indictment and, due 
to his declining health and limited mobility, requested to appear at his com-
bined guilty plea and sentencing hearing via videoconference.25 The district 
court granted Bethea’s request and arranged for Bethea to plea and appear for 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Bethea, 888 F.3d at 866 (first citing Williams, 641 F.3d at 764–65; then citing Torres-
Palma, 290 F.3d at 1248; then citing Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 303–04; and then citing Navarro, 169 
F.3d at 235–39) (detailing how the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits rejected expanding 
Rule 43 to include presence via videoconference). 
 23 Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Gregory Bethea at 3, Bethea, 888 F.3d 864 (No. 3:17-
cr-00008-JDP-1). Bethea used the fraudulently obtained credit cards to purchase merchandise 
ranging from food to electronics to clothing from retailers, such as Sam’s Club. Id.; Brief of Plain-
tiff-Appellee at 3, Bethea, 888 F.3d 864 (No. 3:17-cr-00008-JDP-1). The total of all of Bethea’s 
attempted purchases with his fraudulently obtained credit cards was $91,820.32. Reply Brief of 
Defendant-Appellant, supra, at 3. Authorities also found Bethea had used additional fraudulent 
credit cards in 2016. Id. at 22. While Bethea was only charged for his fraudulent activity in 2014, 
the trial judge placed great weight on the fact that Bethea still had fraudulent credit cards while his 
health was steadily declining when the judge imposed a prison sentence during Bethea’s combined 
plea and sentencing hearing. Id. 
 24 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 23, at 3; see 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a) (2012) (“Whoever—
(1) knowingly and with intent to defraud produces, uses, or traffics in one or more counterfeit access 
devices . . . shall, if the offense affects interstate or foreign commerce, be punished as provided in 
subsection (c) of this section.”); id. § 1029(e)(1) (defining counterfeit access devices as “any device 
that is counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged, or an identifiable component of an access device”). 
In this case, Bethea used Discover credit card numbers that did not belong to him to make pur-
chases across Wisconsin. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 23, at 3. Congress enacted 18 
U.S.C. § 1029 due to the rise of computer hacking and the sentiment that fraudulent activity, particu-
larly fraudulent credit card purchases, affect interstate commerce and must be penalized under a 
criminal statute to deter related activity. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 
1029 (2018); see United States v. Scartz, 838 F.2d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming that gaining 
bank authorization to further fraudulent credit card use affects interstate commerce). 
 25 Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 23, at 3, 6. Bethea was on a continuous 
dialysis regimen. Id. He received care from physicians in Milwaukee to implement his dialysis, to 
provide retinal treatment, cardiac care treatment, and treatment for Charcot joint syndrome. Id. 
Charcot joint syndrome left Bethea susceptible to fractures even from minor physical conduct. Id. 
Bethea was also wheelchair-bound and had a medical boot on one foot. Id. Nine days before his 
combined guilty plea and sentencing hearing, Bethea received a heart stent. Id. 
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sentencing via videoconference.26 On December 1, 2017, after a plea colloquy, 
the court accepted Bethea’s plea via videoconference and sentenced him to 
twenty-one months’ imprisonment.27 The court acknowledged that, although 
Bethea’s health was a mitigating factor in determining whether prison time 
was appropriate, the court ultimately imposed prison time on Bethea because 
he continued his illegal conduct well after realizing his health was deteriorat-
ing.28  
Bethea then timely appealed his conviction and argued that his guilty 
plea via videoconference was impermissible under Rule 43(a).29 On the same 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 865. The parties disputed whether the government or Bethea first sug-
gested Bethea appear via video teleconference. Compare Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, 
supra note 23, at 3 (alleging the government first proposed the defendant affirmatively waive his 
physical presence requirement via videoconference), with Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 
23, at 17 (asserting the defendant invited the error by appearing via videoconference). Bethea 
contended the government’s invited error argument was irrelevant because the government was 
the first to suggest in an email that Bethea appear via videoconference. Reply Brief of Defendant-
Appellant, supra note 23, at 3. The Seventh Circuit did not decide who initiated the request for the 
defendant to appear via videoconference because, regardless of which party initially recommended 
the defendant appear via videoconference, the court determined the defendant was incapable of 
waiving his right to be present in the courtroom during plea and sentencing hearings. Bethea, 888 
F.3d at 865. 
 27 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 865; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 23, at 6. Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the judge and defendant to engage in a conversation, 
known as a plea colloquy, in open court under oath before the defendant enters a guilty plea. FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 11. In this case, the plea colloquy consisted of the judge asking Bethea questions to 
ensure that Bethea’s plea was voluntary. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 23, at 5; 
see 22 C.J.S., supra note 2, § 239 (citing Matusiak v. Kelly, 786 F.2d 536, 543 (2d Cir. 1986)) 
(detailing a judge’s determination of voluntariness based on the defendant’s understanding of 
protections relinquished by accepting a guilty plea, including the right to a trial). Following the 
colloquy, the judge determined that Bethea comprehended the charges, the potential penalties, and 
the rights he gave up in pleading guilty. Bethea, 888 F.3d at 865; Reply Brief of Defendant-
Appellant, supra note 23, at 5. 
 28 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 865. The sentence of twenty-one months’ imprisonment was at the 
lowest end of the sentencing scale under the sentencing guidelines. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, 
supra note 23, at 6. Federal sentencing guidelines help mitigate disparity in imprisonment time by 
considering (1) the criminal conduct at issue and (2) the defendant’s prior criminal infractions. 
Dawinder Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 681 (2015). Due to Bethea’s prior 
criminal history and the amount of fraudulently purchased merchandise in excess of $40,000 but 
less than $95,000, the guidelines recommended an imprisonment sentence in the range of twenty-
one to twenty-seven months. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 23, at 3–4. When 
asked by defense counsel to heavily consider Bethea’s deteriorating health in support of defense 
counsel’s contention that health care in Bethea’s community would be superior to health care in 
prison, the judge noted that he was troubled that Bethea’s deteriorating health had not prevented 
him from continuing to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(1) even until 2016. Bethea, 888 F.3d at 865; 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 23, at 8. 
 29 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 865. Bethea filed his appeal on December 5, 2017, a day after the dis-
trict court entered its written judgment in Bethea’s sentencing. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra 
note 23, at 9. The errors Bethea alleged on appeal illuminate why Bethea changed his mind on the 
use of videoconference at his plea and sentencing hearing. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, 
supra note 23, at 18–20. By pleading guilty, Bethea had hoped to avoid prison time because he 
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day that Bethea appealed the court’s acceptance of his video teleconference 
plea and his twenty-one month sentence, Bethea’s trial counsel moved to 
withdraw as counsel for the appeal.30 On appeal, Bethea’s new counsel ar-
gued that his guilty plea and sentence must be vacated because the court’s 
acceptance of Bethea’s guilty plea via teleconference violated Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure Rule 43(a)’s requirement that Bethea be physically 
present in the courtroom.31 
II. LEGAL CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK OF BETHEA 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision is a matter of first impression regarding 
whether it is invited error or per se prejudicial error for a defendant to waive 
his or her right to be physically present in the courtroom during a combined 
plea and sentencing hearing for a felony charge by appearing via videocon-
ference.32 While other jurisdictions have not decided the exact question, the 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have ruled on related issues of pres-
ence requirements, and those circuits have determined that physical presence 
is a requirement that cannot be waived.33 The courts have found that physical 
presence is imperative because of the intangible benefits of face-to-face 
                                                                                                                           
feared for his health and safety given the combination of his medical conditions and the unsanitary 
conditions of prison. Id. at 7. On appeal, Bethea assigned error to the court’s references to his 
health issues at sentencing, but the Seventh Circuit did not need to reach the substance of that 
argument given the court’s holding that physical presence was not waivable so Bethea had to be 
resentenced anyway. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 23, at 18; see Bethea, 888 
F.3d at 867 (citing Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1248) (recognizing that Rule 43 requires physical 
presence during sentencing to uphold a defendant’s constitutional rights and that it is a per se 
prejudicial error to allow a defendant to waive his physical presence requirement). 
 30 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 23, at 9. The Federal Defenders Service of Wiscon-
sin initially represented Bethea at trial before withdrawing as counsel for the appeal. Id. In their 
motion to withdraw as counsel, the Federal Defenders Service of Wisconsin argued it would be 
“poor form” for the office to argue the judge violated Rule 43(a) by allowing Bethea to be sen-
tenced via videoconference, which it had requested at trial. Id. at 10. 
 31 Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 23, at 9. 
 32 United States v. Bethea, 888 F.3d 864, 866 (7th Cir. 2018) (highlighting that no other cir-
cuit had ruled on the effect of a defendant waiving his physical presence). The invited error doc-
trine precludes a party from appealing an issue that the party introduces because the party was the 
one who instigated the error. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 488 (1997). Contra Bethea, 
888 F.3d at 867 (citing Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1248) (stating a per se judicial error is a re-
versible error that must be corrected on appeal). 
 33 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 867. In United States v. Lawrence, the Fourth Circuit rejected expand-
ing Rule 43 beyond physical presence. United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300, 305 (4th Cir. 
2001). Similarly, in United States v. Navarro, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the benefits of vide-
oconference yet concluded that Rule 43 prohibited its use. 169 F.3d 228, 237 (5th Cir. 1999). The 
Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Williams, also declined to expand Rule 43 beyond its explicit 
narrow exceptions. 641 F.3d 758, 765 (6th Cir. 2011). In addition, the Tenth Circuit, in United 
States v. Torres-Palma, held it was per se judicial error to allow the defendant waive the physical 
presence requirement. 290 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir. 2002). 
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communication provides that are not present during videoconferences.34 
Drawing on the related decisions, the positions articulated by the government 
and the defendant in United States v. Bethea categorize the District Court’s 
decision to allow the defendant to waive his physical presence requirement in 
two ways.35 The government argued that the decision was an invited error, 
which is one the defendant should be precluded from arguing because the 
defendant introduced it.36 Bethea on the other hand argued that the decision 
was a per se prejudicial error, meaning the plea should be vacated based on 
the sole fact of the violation of Rule 43.37 The split between the parties’ cate-
gorization of the error is significant because both positions seek to protect 
defendants’ rights during felony proceedings and uphold the integrity of the 
court system in divergent ways.38 
The government advocated for a harmless error analysis when subject-
ing invited errors to appellate review, meaning that the defendant’s lack of 
physical presence should not be a cause for a remand because the error did 
not prejudice the defendant.39 In 2011, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. 
Gaya, discussed the denial of an appeal due to an invited error by a defend-
ant.40 The court refused to classify a defense lawyer’s misunderstanding of a 
judge’s instructions as a reversible error, where the defense lawyer neglected 
to clarify the instructions and misguidedly harped on discussing documents 
with his client in the midst of cross-examination.41 In Bethea, the government 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 867; see Williams, 641 F.3d at 764–65 (“Being physically present in 
the same room with another has certain intangible and difficult to articulate effects that are wholly 
absent when communicating by video conference.”); United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595, 
599–601 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining how in-person courtroom proceedings allow a judge to evalu-
ate credibility and assess the “moral-fiber” of parties in a way that would not otherwise be possi-
ble via videoconference). 
 35 Compare Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 23, at 4–6 (characterizing the 
waiver as a per se judicial error), with Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 23, at 14 (describing 
defendant’s waiver of Rule 43’s physical presence requirement as an invited error). 
 36 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 23, at 14. 
 37 Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 23, at 4–6; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, 
supra note 23, at 14. 
 38 See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 23, at 4–6 (seeking to maintain protec-
tions for defendants during felony proceedings including the right to appeal errors allegedly insti-
gated by the government); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 23, at 14 (seeking to prevent 
manipulation of the court system by appealing invited errors to better allocate sparse judicial re-
sources). 
 39 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 23, at 14, 21. 
 40 United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] party may not ‘invite’ error 
and then argue on appeal that the error for which he was responsible entitles him to relief.”) (in-
ternal citation omitted). 
 41 Id. During the cross-examination of the defendant, Rosales, the government sought to im-
peach Rosales’s testimony through the use of phone records. Id. at 637. Rosales’s attorney object-
ed to the introduction of the phone records because they were not previously submitted in evi-
dence. Id. The judge adjourned the trial for the day resolving to decide the permissibility of the 
phone records after the overnight recess. Id. The judge further instructed Rosales’s attorney not to 
2019] Videoconferencing and Physical Presence in Felony Proceedings II.-173 
focused on Bethea’s request to appear via video teleconference.42 In the gov-
ernment’s view, Bethea invited the error he assigned on appeal and thus 
should be precluded from rescinding his plea because the error was harmless 
and inconsequential to the result.43 
Bethea argued for a strict interpretation of the physical presence re-
quirement in Rule 43 and categorized any such waiver as a per se prejudicial 
error.44 Notably, four other circuits had employed a similar interpretation of 
Rule 43 to arrive at their conclusions regarding whether a judge must be pre-
sent in the courtroom, whether a denial of defendant’s request for a videocon-
ference should be reversed, and whether a defendant may appear via vide-
oconference for a sentencing hearing.45 Although Rule 43 does not explicitly 
define “presence” as physical presence in the courtroom, those circuits had 
                                                                                                                           
discuss “this” with his client. Id. (noting that “this” clearly referred to the phone records). Later 
that evening, Rosales’s attorney sent a memorandum to the court in which he incorrectly assumed 
that he was barred from discussing the phone records with his client and all other communications 
with his client during the overnight recess. Id. The court did not see the memorandum until the 
following day and ultimately barred the use of the phone records at trial. Id. On appeal, Rosales’s 
attorney claimed that the judge’s instructions resulted in reversible error because the judge’s am-
biguous instructions prevented him from conferring with his client. Id. The Seventh Circuit held 
the error was invited. Id. at 640. The court reasoned Rosales’s attorney could have immediately 
clarified the judge’s instructions and, in fact, the judge specified that Rosales’s attorney could 
instruct his client on what they had discussed. Id. The court also found it compelling that after the 
judge’s dismissal of the phone records, Rosales’s attorney did not seek additional time to confer 
with his client, indicating that Rosales’s attorney only cared about discussing the phone records. 
Id. at 641. 
 42 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 23, at 14, 16. For a discussion of the dispute regard-
ing whether the government or the defendant initially suggested to appear via videoconference, 
see supra note 26. 
 43 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 23, at 17. The Seventh Circuit never addressed the 
merits of this argument because it found the physical presence requirement could not be waived. 
Bethea, 888 F.3d at 867. An invited error is one that is encouraged or prompted by the conduct of 
a party at trial, which waives that party’s right to complain on appeal. 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039.2 (2d ed. 2018). 
 44 Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 23, at 18. Bethea argued that the govern-
ment’s reliance on United States v. Benabe, which held that a Rule 43(c) violation for presence 
due to unruliness during courtroom proceedings was not a per se error, was misplaced because, 
unlike Rule 43(c), Rule 43(a) explicitly requires the defendant to be present during plea and sen-
tencing hearings. Id. at 5 (citing United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 771–74 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
Bethea highlighted that he was never physically present in the courtroom at the same time as the 
judge, and therefore argued that an analogy to the applications of Rule 43(c) was inapplicable. Id.; 
see FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c) (waiving the right of continued physical presence after the defendant 
was initially physically present at trial). 
 45 Williams, 641 F.3d at 764–65 (narrowly reading Rule 43 to encompass only physical pres-
ence and precluding the use of virtual reality as a substitute); Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1248 
(holding that a violation of Rule 43 is a per se prejudicial error); Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 303–04 
(finding a defendant’s sentence must be vacated because the defendant was not physically present 
at the sentencing hearing); Navarro, 169 F.3d at 235–39 (emphasizing that “presence” in Rule 43 
indicates physical presence). 
II.-174 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
held that the plain meaning of the word “presence” indicates physical pres-
ence.46 
In 2002, the Sixth Circuit ruled, in United States v. Williams, that the dis-
trict court did not have the discretion to conduct a sentencing hearing via vid-
eoconferencing. 47 The court declined to consider the government’s argument 
that videoconferences enhance the trial efficiency and are effective to hear 
both parties argument given the nature of uninterrupted video feeds.48 Instead, 
the court read Rule 43 narrowly due to the exhaustive list of exceptions in the 
rule that did not include an exemption for felony sentencing via videoconfer-
ence. 49 Similarly, in 2002, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Torres-
Palma, ruled that a trial judge did not have the discretion, despite the judge’s 
best intentions to ease the burden of the caseload for border proceedings, to 
require the defendant to appear via videoconferencing due to the strict word-
ing of Rule 43.50 In that case, the court explicitly indicated that violation of 
Rule 43 was a per se prejudicial error.51 Further, the court noted that if a party 
did not like the result the appropriate avenue for change was to petition the 
drafters of the rule, not the courts. 52 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S CORRECT RULING MISSES  
AN OPPORTUNITY TO DIG DEEPER 
While the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the presence requirement in 
Rule 43 was consistent with its sister circuits and the plain language of the 
rule, courts should nonetheless exercise their advocacy role to encourage 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Williams, 641 F.3d at 764–65; Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1248; Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 
303–04; Navarro, 169 F.3d at 235–39. 
 47 Williams, 641 F.3d at 764–65. 
 48 Id. The prosecution emphasized that during the defendant’s sentencing via videoconferenc-
ing, all the parties effectively saw and heard each other without any delay in the video feed. Id. 
 49 Id. The court in Williams reviewed the defendant’s claim de novo because the government 
neglected to object to such a standard of review and therefore the government forfeited the oppor-
tunity for the court to apply a plain-error review of defendant’s waiver. Id. at 763–64. The court 
found the exceptions to Rule 43’s presence requirement, including the ability for a court to waive a 
defendant’s continued presence due to unruly behavior in court, were inapplicable. Id. at 764 & n.1. 
 50 Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1244, 1248. In Torres-Palma, the trial judge was presented with 
numerous logistical problems arising from the defendant’s alleged criminal activity across the 
Mexico-New Mexico border. Id. at 1245. Because local district courts are often overwhelmed by 
the number of such cases, other judges from outside the district presided over some matters on a 
voluntary basis. Id. In Torres-Palma, the jury was picked from a local pool in the district in New 
Mexico, but the case was tried by Judge Sven Holmes of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Oklahoma. Id. 
 51 Id. at 1248. The court rejected the government’s harmless error analysis ruling that whether 
there was prejudice or not was irrelevant given Rule 43’s explicit requirement. Id. 
 52 Id. (noting that the court was bound by the limits of Rule 43’s list of exceptions and could 
not expand the rule’s scope). 
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changes to the rule.53 Section A of this Part discusses why the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s ruling was correct by exploring the scope of the videoconferencing ex-
ception to the physical presence requirement and the intangible benefits of 
physical presence.54 Section B argues that, in the interests of justice, the Sev-
enth Circuit missed an opportunity to argue for modifications to Rule 43.55 
A. The Seventh Circuit Narrowly Applies the Videoconferencing Exception 
The Seventh Circuit analyzed the drafters’ inclusion of a videoconfer-
encing exception in Rule 43.56 The court focused on the drafters’ inclusion of 
videoconferencing for misdemeanor offense hearings in its 2011 amend-
ments, without any mention of videoconferencing for felony offense hear-
ings.57 While the court sympathized with arguments in favor of videoconfer-
encing for felony plea and sentencing hearings, the text of Rule 43 con-
strained the court’s decision.58 
In reviewing the interpretation of a rule of criminal procedure, it is the 
court’s duty to look to the plain meaning of a rule and to construe those words 
in the context of the rulebook by looking to the drafters’ intent.59 The drafters’ 
inclusion of exemptions to the physical presence requirement indicates, that 
outside that inclusive list, the drafters’ perceived that the benefits of physical 
                                                                                                                           
 53 United States v. Bethea, 888 F.3d 864, 867 (7th Cir. 2018); see United States v. Williams, 
641 F.3d 758, 764–65 (6th Cir. 2011) (reading Rule 43 to mean only physical presence and find-
ing virtual presence could not be a substitute); United States v. Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d 1244, 
1248 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that a violation of Rule 43 is a per se prejudicial error); United 
States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300, 303–04 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding a defendant’s sentence must be 
vacated because the defendant was not physically present at his sentencing hearing); United States 
v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 235–39 (5th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that “presence” in Rule 43 means 
physical presence). 
 54 See infra notes 56–64 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 65–76 and accompanying text. 
 56 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 866. Rule 43(a) allows courts to use videoconferencing under Rule 5 
for a defendant’s initial appearance, and Rule 10 for a defendant’s arraignment. FED. R. CRIM. P. 
5(f), 10(c), 43. Rule 43(b)(2) contains Rule 43’s only explicit mention and allowance of videocon-
ferencing, which is limited to proceedings related to misdemeanor offenses. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43. 
That provision was irrelevant here because Bethea’s charge at issue was a felony. Bethea, 888 
F.3d at 866. 
 57 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 866 (finding it “telling” that the drafters refrained from including vide-
oconferencing for felony offenses when the drafters explicitly allowed videoconferencing for 
misdemeanor offenses). 
 58 Id. at 868 (expressing a desire that Rule 43 allowed more leeway in videoconferencing 
where the defendant had significant health problems, yet refraining to define what constitutes a 
“significant health problem”). 
 59 Navarro, 169 F.3d at 237 (rejecting the dissent’s argument that “presence” in Rule 43 could 
require mere sight presence as opposed to in-person presence because a common sense reading of 
Rule 43(b) requires the court to read presence as physical presence in the phrase “initially present 
in the courtroom”). 
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presence for felony cases outweighed any burdens on time and expense.60 
The Seventh Circuit was consistent with its sister circuits in viewing the plain 
meaning and context of Rule 43.61 
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit highlighted the intangible benefits of 
physical presence in the courtroom for both the defendant and the judge.62 
While the Seventh Circuit glossed over the implications of those benefits to 
the judicial process, the physical presence requirement in Rule 43 reinforces 
the underpinnings of the Sixth Amendment by protecting the defendant from 
a trial proceedings in his absence.63 Further, as discussed in more detail by 
sister circuits, requiring physical presence upholds the integrity of courtroom 
proceedings by allowing judges to better assess non-verbal cues.64 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See id. at 238 (acknowledging the court’s sympathies to the government’s argument to ease 
the court’s caseload through the use of videoconference, yet declining to consider such factors 
because it is outside the scope of the court’s analysis of an unambiguous rule). 
 61 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 867. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have determined that 
Rule 43 requires a defendant’s physical presence in the courtroom, and waiver is not permitted. 
Williams, 641 F.3d at 764–65; Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1248; Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 303–04; 
Navarro, 169 F.3d at 235–39. 
 62 See Bethea, 888 F.3d at 866–67. In-person proceedings allow the judge to observe non-
verbal cues, prevent adverse inferences due to lack of physical presence, and promote immediate 
and efficient communication between the defendant and counsel. Id.; Williams, 641 F.3d at 764; 
Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1246–48; Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 303–05; Navarro, 169 F.3d at 238–
39. 
 63 See Bethea, 888 F.3d at 867; Wade v. United States, 441 F.2d 1046, 1050–51 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) (holding that the defendant’s absence during open court proceedings between judge and 
jury constituted reversible error because of the reasonable possibility of prejudice against the de-
fendant for his absence); United States v. Lockwood, 382 F. Supp. 1111, 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) 
(holding that the defendant’s presence in the courtroom during proceedings is explicit in Rule 43 
for sentencing hearings, but that the requirement does not extend to pretrial motions). While not 
mentioned in the case law, the rise of hacking has decreased the reliability of a videoconference feed 
to be pure and unmanipulated. See Scott M. Wornow & Richard F. Langan, Jr., Communications 
Technology-Conferencing-Video, Web and “Always-on” Technologies, in SUCCESSFUL PARTNER-
ING BETWEEN INSIDE & OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 28:11 (May 2018) (discussing the security risks of 
professional hackers in regards to videoconference lines). Additionally, without being able to see 
the defendant’s full surroundings on a videoconference during a plea hearing, it is more difficult to 
assess whether a defendant is being coerced by another person in the room who is out of the camera’s 
view. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 750 (1970) (noting that coercion is a viola-
tion of voluntarily giving a plea); State v. Peters, 615 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) 
(Hoover, J., concurring) (conceiving that a defendant could be coerced by a police officer in the 
room during a videoconference plea hearing), rev’d on other grounds, 628 N.W.2d 470 (Wis. 
2001). 
 64 Williams, 641 F.3d at 765; United States v. Thompson, 599 F.3d 595, 599–601 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
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B. The Seventh Circuit’s Missed Opportunity to Advocate for Discretion in 
Rule 43 When There Are Excessive Burdens on Defendants 
Despite the sound reasoning of the opinion, the Seventh Circuit neglect-
ed an opportunity to encourage Congress to modify Rule 43.65 Given the fi-
nancial and time burdens on some defendants—particularly those with seri-
ous health problems—to appear at trial proceedings, the Seventh Circuit 
should have explicitly addressed the implications of allowing the court discre-
tion when a defendant has an undue burden, like a health problem, and should 
have called on the drafters to implement such a change.66 
In United States v. Torres-Palma, the Tenth Circuit, while addressing 
travel burdens and expenses, albeit focusing on indigent defendants without 
health problems, explicitly called on the drafters to consider modifying Rule 
43 to account for further exemptions to the physical presence requirement.67 
In United States v. Navarro, the Fifth Circuit, alluded to the potential for 
Congress to declare that videoconferencing satisfies the presence require-
ment.68 Despite those strong sentiments from its sister circuits, Bethea is not 
the first time a court in the Seventh Circuit declined to articulate a strong 
stance for change to Rule 43.69 
Similar to Bethea, in United States v. Brunner, the defendant had severe 
health problems and was practically immobile.70 The cost to transport the 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 868; c.f. Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1245, 1248 (discussing the benefits 
of videoconferencing). 
 66 See Bethea, 888 F.3d at 868 (expressing the court’s sympathies and the defendant’s appeal-
ing argument, yet refraining to propose any broader change to the drafters for Rule 43). In Bethea, 
only at the end of its opinion did the court suggest that it would be “sensible” for a court to have 
discretion to permit videoconferences when a defendant has serious health problems. Id. The court 
did not articulate as strong a stance as the court in Torres-Palma or the dissent in Navarro to sug-
gest that such a change could and should occur. See Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1245, 1248 (ad-
dressing the efficiency and monetary benefits of videoconferencing); Navarro, 169 F.3d at 242 
(Politz, J., dissenting) (noting that videoconferencing would ease financial burdens and prevent 
time delays). 
 67 Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d at 1244, 1248. 
 68 Navarro, 169 F.3d at 235, 239. 
 69 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 868 (recognizing the potential benefit of videoconferences when a 
defendant faces significant health problems, but refusing to call for a change to Rule 43’s physical 
presence requirement); United States v. Brunner, No. 14-cr-189, 2016 WL 6110457, at *3 (E.D. 
Wis. Sept. 23, 2016). As opposed to Bethea, in Brunner the court denied defendant’s request to 
appear via videoconference given the scope of Rule 43. Compare Bethea, 888 F.3d at 868 (de-
scribing the lower court’s grant of the defendant’s request to appear via videoconference due to 
the defendant’s failing health), with Brunner, 2016 WL 6110457, at *3 (acknowledging the con-
straints on physical presence in the courtroom due to the defendant’s health situation, but ultimate-
ly denying the defendant’s request to appear via videoconference due to the strict physical pres-
ence requirements of Rule 43). 
 70 Brunner, 2016 WL 6110457, at *3. Brunner was charged for fraudulently concealing assets 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and lying during his bankruptcy case in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152. Id. 
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defendant to the courtroom ran upwards of $3,000.71 In Brunner the Seventh 
Circuit only flatly stated that while common sense would suggest weighing 
the burdens of travel and damages to the defendant’s health when granting a 
request to appear via videoconference for a defendant, the court’s hands were 
tied.72 In Bethea, the Seventh Circuit missed its second chance to advocate 
for the implementation of more socially conscious discretion in Rule 43 to 
ease the burden on defendants to physically be present in the courtroom dur-
ing proceedings.73 That decision, and others like it, stagnate, rather than act as 
a catalyst for, changes to Rule 43 to benefit indigent defendants with severe 
health and mobility issues.74 Given the disparity in incarceration of indigent 
defendants, it is imperative for the court to discuss methods to ease the finan-
cial and time burdens on defendants.75 Otherwise, the court fails to incite 
change against “cash register justice” that continues to oppress indigent de-
fendants, while also undermining the purpose of the Sixth Amendment to 
provide just treatment for those during courtroom proceedings.76 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. The government did not dispute the financial and medical difficulties that Brunner 
would face appearing in-person for his proceedings. Id. The government’s argument in Brunner, 
like the defendant’s argument in Bethea, focused on a plain reading of Rule 43. Compare Bethea, 
888 F.3d at 868 (asserting that it was permissible for the district court to grant defendant’s affirm-
ative waiver of his physical presence requirement), with Brunner, 2016 WL 6110457, at *1 (argu-
ing that Rule 43 forecloses the opportunity for the defendant to appear via videoconference). 
 72 Brunner, 2016 WL 6110457, at *3 (referencing the court’s sympathies to the defendant and 
his appealing argument, yet refraining to advocate a strong stance for a proposed change by the 
drafters). 
 73 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 868; Brunner, 2016 WL 6110457, at *3; see Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 305 
(stating that Rule 43 “should indeed provide some flexibility” beyond only physical presence). 
 74 See Bethea, 888 F.3d at 868 (expressing the court’s sympathies and the defendant’s appeal-
ing argument yet refraining to propose any broader change to the drafters for Rule 43). 
 75 Id.; see Laura I Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in 
the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1483–85 (2016) (illustrating examples of how exces-
sive costs in justice administration can lead to further marginalization of indigent defendants, 
including how Alabama Circuit Court Judge Wiggins, requires defendants to either donate blood 
to pay their fine or go to jail); Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of 
Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2184–87 (2013) (providing data detailing economic disparity in the 
criminal justice system and highlighting that indigent defendants receive disproportionately longer 
imprisonment times in sentencing pleas); Sidhu, supra note 28, at 701 (describing how despite the 
uniform sentencing guidelines’ best efforts to create uniformity in sentencing, the actuarial tables 
used may exacerbate the disparities in sentencing by causing a poor, high risk offender to be sen-
tenced to a longer term than a wealthy, low risk offender). 
 76 Bethea, 888 F.3d at 868; see Appleman, supra note 75, at 1516–20 (arguing that excessive 
costs impose a punishment on defendants without the say of a jury as required by the Sixth 
Amendment). A telling sentiment of Bethea’s case: “[a]lthough one might reluctantly accept [vacat-
ing the District Court’s plea and sentencing], it is proper in light of Rule 43(a)’s text and the pertinent 
caselaw.” Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 23, at 14. 
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CONCLUSION 
In United States v. Bethea, the Seventh Circuit sided with the Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits by emphasizing the importance of the physi-
cal presence requirement for a defendant during felony plea and sentencing 
hearings and found that a violation of the requirement is a per se judicial er-
ror, even where a defendant has affirmatively consented to appear via vide-
oconference. The Seventh Circuit relied on the 2011 amendment permitting 
waiver of the physical presence requirement via videoconferencing for mis-
demeanor offenses for its interpretation of the statutory construction of Rule 
43. While the Seventh Circuit did not deeply explore the intangible benefits 
of physical presence, requiring physical presence by a defendant does uphold 
the integrity of the judicial process by preventing adverse inferences of the 
defendant, allowing for observation of nonverbal cues, and allowing better 
communication between the defendant and defense counsel. However, by 
declining to reference the bigger picture of concerns for defendants, particu-
larly indigent defendants with health and mobility problems, the Seventh Cir-
cuit missed an opportunity to address the need for accommodations to Rule 
43’s presence requirement. 
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